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“Bring your knowledge of disaster” 
(telegram summoning Ch. Beard to Tôkyô after the great
earthquake)
The catastrophe is that things go on as heretofore. 
(W. Benjamin)
0. Preliminary: On Stance and Epistemology
All concepts wherein a whole semiotic process is gathered up
elude definition; only what is without history can be defined.
Nietzsche, Genealogie der Moral
I shall be assuming in this essay that the vantage point or
stance of each of us should be foregrounded in order to compensate
for unavoidable blind spots, so that it behooves me to begin with
identifying, as non-privately as possible, my own bearing
(Haltung). Faced with the huge and growing pathologies and
pandemics devouring our bodies politic, the injunction “Physician,
heal thyself” preserves its force. 
I shall therefore start with some matters I went into at more
length in other places, including an earlier issue of this journal
(Suvin “Brecht” and “Theses”), which foregrounded precisely the
“standpoint theory”—educed by Lukács from some hints in Marx,
simplified to unrecognizability by the Stalinist sectarians (thus
proving that the corruption of the best is the worst), and revived
not at first by Neo-Marxists as much as by Liberation Theologians
and Feminists (see Hartsock) in the guise of a “preferential option
for the poor” in one case, and “for women” in the other. This
position could embrace philosophy's traditional self-reflexivity,
but it is more ambitious. It claims that epistemologically (i.e. at
a level deeper than merely conceptual ideology) one's assiette dans
la vie or mise en situation, in short one's practical bodily
position and bearing as member of given social groups, centrally
codetermines one's understanding, its limits, and privileged foci.
And as to my standpoint: it is the one cited in my introduction
apropos of Benjamin: that of a person who has left his class
without finding another one — but attempting nonetheless to keep by
means of work a stance of solidarity in which the dispossessed,
exploited, and humiliated have a preferential epistemological claim
on us, citizens and searchers, much transcending the merely
ethical. 
What happens to this point of view in what a poet has properly
called our indigent times (dürftige Zeit —shabby, needy, mean,
paltry, poor, penurious times)? And how can it deal with the
Subject?
Let me try to give a personal answer to the first question,
about the stance. It is probably best phrased in terms of a
presently sustainable attitude to Enlightenment. In brief, the
valid aspect  or legacy of Enlightenment is for me confidence in
human reason, in the possibility (however fragile) of people
understanding their common world. The dubious aspect is the
assumption that this is Reason in caps, i.e. that it arrives at
asymptotically absolute values or an objective view (in all senses
of that term—see e.g. Johnson and others discussed at length in
Suvin “Cognitive”). At the root of both aspects is, I believe, the
fact that the bourgeoisie sees itself as the representative of the
whole people (or nation —and in its confident, revolutionary phase
rightly so) and therefore believes that its own revolution and
ensuing dispensation is the final one. If final then absolute; if
absolute then its value (Reason, Humanity, History) is a lay
equivalent of God. The Enlightenment thus attempts to laicize the
eye of God. If laicizing means explanation of matter from within
itself, being “interpreters of our own enterprise” (Rabelais), this
is a great and absolutely necessary phase of liberation. However,
adopting the perspective of God's Eye is not: this remains
metaphysics. The aporia is the historical one of coupling
enlightenment and reason with liberal individualism. Our subject of
The Subject demands facing and indeed going further than this
aporia. 
However, there still remains an unavoidable problem in
epistemology: We have learned that any text or event is most
intimately shaped by its context, and in particular that the
meaning depends on which contextualization is chosen. This is
pithily put by Merleau-Ponty: “He who speaks (and that which he
understands tacitly) always co-determines the meaning of what he
says, the philosopher is always implicated in the problems he
poses” (Visible 90). The context —in culture, the socialized,
usually collective subject—co-determines the object; there is no
absolute object. Yet there is no absolute relativity either: for a
given context, the object can be established with sufficient
precision. This epistemology also has its own context, the reason
for adopting such a position. I would call it a “two hands”
position. On the one hand, it stands against the despotism of an
“absolute” truth, centralized manipulation of people, spatial
confinement (emblem: the police). On the other hand, it stands
against the despotism of an “absolute relativism,” statistical
manipulation of people, informational tutelage (emblem: the credit
computer). Of course, police can use the computer too: their
absolutist fusion is fascism. 
Does then the salutary and modesty-provoking relativization of
acknowledging and foregrounding one's own (personal and collective)
standpoint rob it of any—except a capriciously “me-too”—validity?
Is it simply a surrender to this era's narcissistic and tribalized
relativism, in which (as long as the market circulates!) I have my
right and you have your right, and we are all pluralists—either
sincerely or just by making a virtue out of unbreakable constraint?
Or may some standpoints and bearings be found that are more equal
than others? In other words, if we accept the standpoint theory as
a (so to speak) fundamental syntactic gambit, is there a
semantico-pragmatic hierarchy of values that may be, in an
analytically posterior but politically and ethically mandatory
move, used to judge between various standpoints, once these have
been identified? In still other words, how do we avoid the
Deconstructionist mise en abyme or bad infinite recurrence of
saying that this hierarchy is itself dependent on a standpoint, say
a macro- or meta-standpoint? 
I cannot pretend to have an answer. We are at a point in
history when it is obviously too late and too early for any grand,
unified theory of anything, or even for a modest approach to it.
But I think there are some horizons within which a solution may be
found. They would encompass the historical lessons to be drawn from
both the voluntarist and the estheticist dead-ends, from the
Leviathan and the animula—the dead ends of historiosophical Hegel
without his dialectics vs. the critical Kant without his ethics; or
of Lukács vs. Shklovsky, if you wish.2 A solution would then have
to be sought in a distinction between the short-duration and
closed-group standpoints vs. the long-duration and genuinely open,
dialectical or inter-group standpoints. The latter would, no doubt
in historically complex combinatorics, be able to function—albeit
provisionally and flexibly—as representatives of a humanizing
totality, and thus found a hierarchy of values. That hierarchy
would be able to cut out of potentially infinite rhizomes
constituting our imaginary encyclopedias (Eco, “Dizionario”) a
pragmatically here-and-now privileged tree, whose branchings would
be a guide for decisions. Yet a most important lesson we ought to
have learned is that all (hard-won, unavoidable, indispensable, and
rightly cherished) operative certainties must be desanctified by
keeping in mind that they are just that, so that formal mechanisms
must be found for preventing operative necessities from fossilizing
into longue durée dogmas (the fate of both Social Democracy and
Leninism, as it was of classical revolutionary liberalism earlier
on). This means that heresies are to be encouraged and cherished,
that the Activist and the Fool must not only coexist (as an
ecclesia militans with ecclesia triumphans), but actually enter
into a loving friendship. 
Cognitively speaking, a first, very provisional conclusion is
therefore that acknowledging one's own situatedness, stance, and
orientation does not at all preclude understanding. On the
contrary, a non-neutral and non-absolute (e.g., non-eternal)
cognition will have the strengths of a pragmatic situatedness of
its knowers into bodies, situations, horizons. A “situated
knowledge” is defined by Haraway, in her eponymous and as usual
pathbreaking article, as being “simultaneously an account of
radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing
subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own 'semiotic
technologies' for making meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment to
faithful accounts of a 'real' world” (579; cf. Code 250-64 and
passim). One could quibble about some terms here, signalled by
Haraway's own quotation marks. But I am arguing  a tertium datur
between the untenable horns of Individualist Subject vs. No Subject
is to be sought —and may be found. Though Haraway's article speaks
about feminist objectivity and she distances herself from
“bourgeois, Marxist, or masculinists projects” (593), I believe it
is cognitively exemplary beyond feminism when she asks for a
perspective of partiality (pun intended) and formulates this new
objectivity (and I would say subjectivity) as “[being] about
limited location and situated knowledge,” thus “allow[ing] us to
become answerable for what we learn how to see” (583). 
My conclusion could then be pertinently summed up in two
cognitive imperatives: against absolutism, historicize!; and
against relativism, cognize! This would leave no room for either
essentialism or nihilism. While this may be a “soft” or indeed
transitional epistemology, I think that in industrialized
societies, with rapid circulation of novelties, only a dialectical,
i.e. dynamic and non-theologized, cognition has a chance of being
valid. And thus I arrive at the Subject. 
1. Subject as Social Allegory vs. Self as Interiority and the Pivot
Formulation of Descartes
Mercure: Qui va là?
Sosie: Moi!
Mercure: Qui, moi?
(Molière, Amphitryon)
1.0. The present most unhappy situation of human affairs, where
subjectivity is abused “to unleash economic forces that actually
enslave [people]” (Mowitt xiii), may lead us to repeat (e.g.)
Sloterdijk's suggestive question: “Is a certain coming about of the
'I' (Ichwerdung) perhaps essentially just as catastrophic as the
explosion of a nuclear reactor?” (120) Indeed, is not the immensely
powerful invention of the disembodied, lone, inner- oriented
Cartesian Self strictly analogous, homologous or even
consubstantial to the invention of the “value-free” atom, thus
leading in a direct line to the atomic bombs and reactors of our
century, and lending itself to a fair characterization as a
super-Chernobyl of historical or world-line pollution? 
As one of the central notional categories registering the
deepest shifts in social formations, and in particular the shift
first into and then out of the ideological hegemony of competitive
or market capitalism, the whole complex of “subjectivity” has been
—as researchers have traditionally complained—buffeted and polluted
by hurricanes of obfuscation (cf. on the historical semantics the
indispensable Williams ss.vv. Experience, Individual, Personality,
Subjective). Thus, unless one wants to assume this spiritual
pollution, there is no alternative but to propose a terminological
thesaurus of one's own. E.g., a major piece of present-day
ideological pollution can be immediately cleared away by the
founding Marxian refusal to postulate “'Society'...as an
abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social
being.” (Marx 137-38); this is paraphrased by Volosinov /Bakhtin as
the refusal of “binary opposition [between the 'social' and] the
individual, and hence...the notion that the psyche is individual
while ideology is social.... [All the] properties and attributes of
the ideological individual [are social]. "(34) 
But after destruction, we have to proceed to at least preparing the
grounds for reconstruction. Its semantics have at a minimum to be
clearly articulated as to their inner syntax and pragmatic
suitability. In order to have a chance at extricating it from the
pollution opening with a memorable bang in Descartes, I shall posit
that any such thesaurus has to incorporate the historical long
duration (Braudel's longue durée) and eschew either/or dichotomies
in favour of both/and hierarchies. 
1.1. As I argued in the Propositions for this issue, this mental
hygiene can be achieved by differentiations within the semantic
field of subjectivity. I shall proceed here upon the tracks of
Jean-Pierre Vernant's and Paul Ricoeur's approaches to such
differentiation in the Colloque de Royaumont “Sur l'individu” of
1985. To simplify, streamline, and sometimes contaminate them, they
distinguish three notions, which can in French be elegantly called
“l'individu stricto sensu,” “le sujet,” and “le soi” (or “le moi”).
The first is a not further divisible physical token of any logical
type, and especially of a biological species in Julian Huxley's
sense of “indivisibility—the quality of being sufficiently
heterogeneous in form to be rendered non-functional if cut in half”
(cited in Dawkins 250); in that sense, I translate it, with
hesitancy, as individual (for that word is often used also in the
ideologized bourgeois sense of Self—the third notion here). It
designates any Something (this goldfish, maple tree or province) by
three principal means: definite description, proper name or
indicator (pronoun, adverb, etc.). The second is a human
“individual” communicating in her own name, expressing himself “in
the first person” with traits that differentiate her from others of
the same logical type-token and biological species-variety-race
(etc.)—most importantly, from an ethnic, class, and gender group.
To the individuation above, this adds identification, and I shall
call it the Subject. For a Subject, the pronoun “I” is no longer a
shifter, an itinerant marker applicable to any speaker, but it is
anchored in a fixed stance or bearing; this makes dialogue
possible, where—however—the anchoring is reversible, “I” can be
understood as “thou” and vice versa (cf. Ricoeur 62). Finally, the
Self (ipse, Selbst) is constituted by the practices and stances 
which confer upon the subject a dimension of
interiority..., which constitute him from within as...a
singular individual whose authentic nature resides wholly
in the secret of her inner life, at the heart of an
intimacy to which nobody, outside of himself, can have
access.... (Vernant, “L'individu” 24)
I shall return to what I see as the crucial matter of
interiority. But here I wish to note a startling fact: only
monotheist cultures seem to have invented the Self and its whole
host of attendant ways of understanding and organizing the world:
“The notion of person will appear in Christian thought” (Meyerson
476). It is not necessary to enter here into why and how this
happened: one can simply remark with Vernant that for the
individual “uncoupled from sociality....[t]he search for God and
the search for Self are two dimensions of the same solitary ordeal”
(“L'individu” 36). The Subject, overtly constituted by sociality,
implies other Subjects. But the Self implies Another:
Platonically—The Other, transcendentally —God. (Incidentally, this
entails that all the worthy talk about The Other, and the ethics
deriving therefrom, are still essentially predicated upon the
individualistic Self.) The search may be called theology, or—from
Bacon and Descartes on—Science, it is in all cases proceeding upon
the One True Way. The consequences, from politics to epistemology,
were to be huge. 
1.2. What this effects is a diametrical inversion of vectors.
Earlier—in literature and art up to and including Boccaccio, Giotto
or Rabelais—the Subject was, for others as well as for himself, a
two-dimensional limit-zone where collective bodies or groups (often
in the allegorical guise of general types) meet and interfere: a
king, an old man, a choleric, a buyer of love for property, etc.,
stripped finally down to Everyman, all of this goes to make Lear;
Agamemnon was rather distinct from Menelaus, but both were largely
determined by being rulers, warriors against Troy, and Atreides.
Now, the subject begins to be seen, first by herself and then by
others insofar as they recognize they are subjects too, as the
central point around which the world becomes that point's
environment (cf. Suvin, To Brecht Part 1, elaborating upon Lukács),
a three-dimensional sphere seen from the inside. Soon, by need for
validation and morphological analogy, a central point is found
inside the Subject itself which relates to the individual body as
that body does to the rest of the environment. That central point,
the irreducible principle of utter alterity or originality whose
loss would be the death of Self, and thus a fate worse than bodily
death, is initially and most clearly semanticized only in relation
to God, as the soul (defined by Plotinus as that which is found
when “everything is taken away”—see Vernant, L'Individu 226). Then
it is fully developed in the richness of thisworldly relationships
as the interiorized character seen simultaneously from inside and
outside, as public and private, therefore stereometrically or “in
the round” (when shamefaced laicized synonyms such as individual
sensu lato, personality or ego are substituted for soul). 
All of this is, of course, centrally a politico-economic,
historical trajectory. While the heroic individual of the
Renaissance still participated in the plenitude of material life,
like Rabelais's giants, from the Reformation on he (sic) devolved
into a Self whose freedom was increasingly interior, located into
an “'inner' sphere” of consciousness, observing rather than
intervening: “Nothing which is in the world and stems from the
world can attack the 'soul' and its freedom; this terrible
utterance [of Luther's], which already makes it possible entirely
to [depreciate] 'outer' misery and to justify it
'transcendentally,' persists as the basis of the Kantian doctrine
of freedom” (Marcuse 56 and 57, and cf. his whole essay “Luther and
Calvin”). In the philosophically influential Descartes variant, the
topological image of the mind/ consciousness as “inner arena” of
ideas was, as Richard Rorty proves, the principal, epoch-making
invention. Human relationships are now, for the first time,
construed as experience occurring in the depths of a
three-dimensional Self (cf. Toulmin, also Suvin “Soul”), which
was—precisely—consciousness. Subject becomes subjectivity, the
world begins to split into subjective and objective states, with
the attendant huge problems of their possible relationships (cf.
Bordo 49ff.). The depth of consciousness grows vertiginous with the
Romantics, and as it were self-destructs in Freud. 
This most novel idea of Selfhood flew in the face of all human
experience and notions, and needed to be validated by a
transcendental grounding (or is it assumption?). Whence did the
Truth get into the Centre? A mouth-stopping validation is the best
answer: Truth was put there by an omnipotent God. In the huge
social breakdowns of the late Roman world empire, whose fears and
horrors may be comparable only to our century's, where polytheism
foundered together with the notion of equal political rights of
citizens and communities, this validation from the new universal
Lord of (Christian) monotheism won out. For every individual this
amounts to the incarnation of truth; it is signalized and
symbolized by the Son's incarnation into Jesus, by the breath of
the Holy Ghost “in-spiring” such inner truth. In the logocratic
tradition of Christianity, mediated by a Holy Scripture and its
exclusive interpreters and enforcers, this is the verbum vitae, the
Word of Life in direct genealogical relation to the Creator, Truth
as the offspring of monotheistic authority. In spite of Bacon's
reply that Truth was the Daughter of Time (i.e. of understanding
through experiment), Romantic anthropology held fast to this
Central or Nuclear Truth of Man, a supreme value which has to be
unveiled as Thaïs or shelled as peas from the pod. Every individual
was a subject of the Lord, but he also had a divine right to be
himself because she had a divine spark in herself. 
The Promethean spark of the quondam soul thus persisted after
the Catholic Lord had been supplanted by Protestantism and
humanism:
In modern Europe the idea of a planned creation of the
world order by one single God was secularized, and thus
prepared in the interior of people the way to creating a
system of formal rights, a rationally organized
bureaucracy, and a unified monetary system through the
absolute monarch as the free subject of responsibility.
The ideational mediation was here exercised by none less
than Descartes, who separated spirit from matter and
undertook the construction of the world of experience
through the cognitive subject (reason [and Self in my
sense, DS]) following the principle of the “cogito.”
(Maruyama 56)
I shall not indulge here in philological reconstructions of
what Descartes “really” meant; his opus seems rich in doubts,
hesitations, and caveats. But this is irrelevant for European
intellectual history: its “Descartes” is the juncture of
transplanting from theology to lay philosophy the image “of a
single inner space in which bodily and perceptual sensations...,
mathematical truths, moral rules, the idea of God, moods of
depression, and all the rest of what we now call 'mental' were
objects of quasi-observation” (R. Rorty 50). This redistribution of
social interfaces into the interiorized Selves brought about “a new
form of identity,” remarks Vernant, in which the human individual
is defined by an unremitting obsession with his interior, e.g. by
“his most intimate thoughts, her secret imaginings, his nocturnal
dreams, her sinful impulses...” (“L'individu” 36-37). The new space
of the Cartesian cogito “as precondition and foundation of all
knowledge about the world, the self, and god” (Vernant, “Preface”
MS 16)—the “Je suis” as locus of individuality and subjectivity,
the soul as “moi”—is quite unheard of in all non-individualist
cultures, e.g. the Hellenic, East Asian, and even European medieval
one. 
As the rigid roles of the ancien régime broke down in the full
assumption of power by the bourgeoisie, the full-fledged ideology
of individualism emerged. It is a political practice and doctrine
according to which the human individual (in this “soulful” sense of
a unified and lasting Self) is the final building brick of the body
politic,3 just as other, identically individual entities (e.g. the
unsplittable atom) are the final building blocks of all other
cosmic levels. The clairvoyant reactionary Tocqueville first
identified individualism in the USA, where its semantics were
invading all other collective categories, such as time and space,
as “a novel expression, to which a novel idea has given birth” (cf.
the discussion of character and individualism in Suvin, “Can
People” 686-88). Individualism as ideology “engender[s] the
cosmico-political dimension and public space itself starting from
the sole ethical selfhood...without the originating social
dimension” (Ricoeur 72). In Aristotle's Politics, we may remember,
the only Subjects who could be sundered from the polis, which is
superordinated to individuals as the whole is to the part, were
gods or beasts (I:2:1253a)—in human terms, divine magi or monsters.
Thus, all the descendants of Robinson Crusoe in the narratives of
political economy and similar fiction brought about by the
bourgeoisie would be monstrous for any non-individualist
tradition—i.e., for 33 of the 34 world civilizations, if I remember
Toynbee's count well. Two or three centuries after Descartes, the
“individualistic self-experience” (Volosinov /Bakhtin 89) grew to
be one of the lonely Self, and Schopenhauer justly proclaimed such
individuation a curse. 
2. Deconstruction: Hello and Goodbye
[The final result of '68 has in French philosophy been] to
engender a hyper-individualism which is perfectly comfortable
with the existing social forms. 
Ferry-Renault, “Sujet” 
2.1. As is well known within the small world of Western academy,
our literary and cultural studies have since the 1970s been beset
by a confrontation between the traditional “humanists” and the
newfangled “deconstructionists.” The Subject (subjectivity, agency,
author/ity) has been one of the main campaign theatres, with battle
cries of, approximately, “free individual and self- expression” vs.
“the I is dead” (“das Ich ist unrettbar” was already Ernst Mach's
conclusion at the turn of the century). From where I stand both
sides have partially good but finally unsatisfactory arguments, and
the only theoretically satisfying horizon would be some
approximation to a shamelessly Hegelian sublation, i.e. negation
plus assumption of both (which practically we may not get in these
unpropitious times, so that we have to go on “pluralistically”
using parts and scraps of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis). I
shall limit myself to a much simplified discussion of the
Post-structuralist Deconstructionists. 
Their strength lies in the “de-” prefix, in the denial of
late-liberal illusions. One can only applaud their assault on
metaphysics and essentialist individualism, even if in comparison
to Marx and Nietzsche—say Marx's fundamental and constant critique
of the Christian and bourgeois “cult of the abstract man” (cf. at
least Marcuse 128ff.)—it was both belated and less well argued.
Historically, the balance-sheet of individualism is by now badly in
the red. Descartes had substituted for the authority of the
Church's God that of the secular I of the cogito —while letting God
back in by a somewhat peripheral garden gate, as the only
imaginable outer validation of the I's interiority. In Robinson
Crusoe and his novel, or already in Prince Hamlet though not
necessarily in the play Hamlet, we may see this consciousness —"the
Western, transcendent, and masculine norm of autobiographical
selfhood" (Brodzki and Schenck 4; though there are interesting
exceptions to the masculinity in the “thick” constructs of art,
beginning precisely with Shakespeare and Defoe). Yet the bite on
reality of this founding individualist myth shrinks in the fullness
of bourgeois time from the rich sceptic traffic with the world of
a Montaigne, through the illusionist space of perspectival
geometry, to an empty space, “ab-solute, un-bound from the world
which no longer supports it, and as the reciprocal term of God” (de
Certeau, Heterologies 94, and cf. Bordo 68ff.). Kant, that
exemplary philosopher of the autonomous and rational Self, has the
great advantage of beginning to demonstrate how intellect
participates in constructing knowledge. Still, so far as I can see,
his “critique” never overcame some central aporias, e.g. what makes
experience and in particular identity possible or how is the
Subject's standpoint constituted within history and/or society, and
thus led to the dead-end of what is usually called “the problem of
the Thing-in-itself” (Ding-an-sich). It then becomes visible that
whatever Descartes's “I think therefore I am” might have been, it
was not (as both he and Kant fervently hoped) a supreme because
direct certainty (cognitio... prima et certissima). Based on
Descartes's own later comments, Nietzsche pointed out that
...cogito, ergo sum presupposes that one knows what is
“thinking” and further what is “being”: thus, if the est
(sum) were true, this would be a certainty based upon two
correct judgments, adding to it a certainty that one had,
to begin with, a right to any concluding, a right to the
ergo—thus, in any case, no direct certainty (Werke 641;
Heidegger disputes this critique, but in any such
confrontation my money is on Nietzsche). 
See also the less sweeping though acute objection: “I maintain that
Cogito ergo sum has no meaning because that little word sum has no
meaning....'I am'...is no answer to any intelligible question.”
(Valéry 9: 54) 
Nothing fails like success. Around the end of the 19th
Century, the Cartesian practice of “maîtres et possesseurs de la
nature” (Discours 100) leads to a massive shift (first in the
France and USA) from the sovereign Victorian—e.g.
Emersonian—character, which is good or bad, to the mass-society
personality, which is famous or anonymous (in tandem with the
non-individual corporation personalized in its trade-marks, which
is profitable or unprofitable), i.e. from ethical ideas to
commodified PR imagery in which “that which appears is good that
which is good appears” (Kipnis 21). This mass-produced Self, moving
on the upswing of the Kondratieff cycle from production-directed to
consumption-directed goals, increasingly shed the liberal
contradiction that the highest Self also implies self-mastery and
self-sacrifice for class ideals, and stressed self-expression and
self-gratification, which yet must (in a new contradiction) remain
sufficiently pseudo-exemplary — replicable or empathizable — for
the personality to remain attractive and “fascinating” (see
Susman's meticulous reconstruction 271-82 and passim, also Meyer).
With the rise of cinema and TV, this soap-opera personality rapidly
colonized first the lower classes in the metropolis and then the
whole globe, reorganized into political nation-states linked by
satellites and computer banking. We see the latest avatar of
this—as I write—in the media foo-faw around the O.J. Simpson murder
trial. 
2.2. In the upshot, repeating known truths is never superfluous.
But we did not quite need the Post-structuralists (whose fer de
lance became the Deconstructionists) to point out that the
bourgeois dispensation has in four centuries never
clarified—theoretically or practically— what (where, how) is this
“I”; and in particular, how is its shibboleth of freedom to be
taken: I am free for or of what? Truly, the “free” individuals are
free from most old attachments but then centrally free to sell
themselves on the labour market, which is lately not buying much.
Their “rounded,” three-dimensional richness is finally a
supermarket and cinerama effect; this is, no doubt, preferable to
the empty shelves found at the bottom of the World Bank totem-pole
but it is in no way similar to the equally empowered billiard-ball
entities demanded by the analytical geometry of human bodies and
forces freely colliding on a level-field market and magically
producing a social space of dignity for all, as demanded by
bourgeois theory from Descartes through Hobbes to Adam Smith. What
Freud called blows to men's narcissism or self-love, evicting the
billiard-ball from the centre of cosmology with Copernicus (and
even more so Bruno), of biology with Darwin, and of psychology with
himself (221), are then on the one hand logical and necessary
dethronements of the still semi-theological ego. Yet while true
freedom from poverty and oppression remains a very precious goal,
the series of bourgeois disenchantments into freedom finally
reconstructs the Subject into a sellable Self. The cogito is thus
revealed as a two-faced, thoroughly ideological coinage: its
welcome desanctification of fossilized Church dogma has as an
increasingly painful obverse the alienation of the cogitators
(except for those statistically irrelevant few who possess
Descartes's private revenues) into more-or-less one-dimensional
sellers of labour-power —including us “value-free” professionals.
This should be kept firmly in mind all the time, since outside our
little academic world (and indeed at the top of its own power
structures) a thoroughly capitalist Cartesianism has never lost its
hegemonic constraining capacity, and seems even to be returning
onto the theoretical terrain in the present Right-wing rollback (at
least in France, see Le Doeuff 122). 
However, it is entirely possible to acknowledge a reasonable
cultural relativism dethroning the idea of individuality without
abolishing the Subject à la Heidegger. Already John Dewey could
remark that “The idea that human nature is inherently or
exclusively individual is itself a product of cultural
individualistic movement. The idea that human nature and
consciousness are intrinsically individual did not even occur to
any one for much the greater part of human history [and
geopolitics, one could add].” (21) Nearer to us, Gadamer concluded:
“The self-consciousness of the individual is only a flickering in
the closed circuit of historical life. That is why a person's
pre-judgments (Vorurteile, prejudices) much rather than his
judgments constitute the historical reality of her being.” (261)
The Post-structuralists share the only hermeneutics available to us
non-PR intellectuals in this historical epoch, which Ricoeur has
well named the hermeneutics of suspicion (soupçon); but they
exasperate it and indeed take it ad absurdum. Beginning with a
simple “structuralizing” denial of subjectivity —e.g. the famous
Barthesian and Foucauldian “death of the author”—this tendency
advances to a Derridean polemic strategy wherein by (his)
definition the subject is not saying —or doing, though the
Post-structuralists speak usually about speaking only—what it seems
to be saying, or even what it thinks it is saying (see
Ferry-Renault, “Sujet” 109). At best, we are in for either a new
literary genre, Derrida's poem-in-prose as philosophy (cf. Cavell
306-09ff.), or a substitution of multiple schizophrenic
subjectivities à la Deleuze and Guattari— protons and electrons
(maybe even neutrons, not to speak of charms and quarks) in lieu of
the unsplittable atom of the bourgeois Self that culminated in
Victorian or Wilhelminian patriarchy. But all of this brings its
own crippling problems, of which I shall here mention two. 
2.3. First, it is by now time to foreground the unacceptable face
of Deconstructionism, which I would identify with the influence of
the post-Kehre, post-Humanismusbrief Heidegger. I am reminded here
of Ernst Bloch's late and terrible suspicion, whose exact quote I
cannot at the moment locate, but which said roughly: behind the
citoyen, we have seen, came the bourgeois; Gnade uns Gott (merciful
god), who is coming behind the comrade? We can today answer: the
bureaucratic despot, or something similar. Now Ferry and Renault,
following Bell and Lipovetsky, have applied this
proto-deconstructionist suspicion to the French Post-structuralists
and Deconstructionists  themselves: 
Has the sixties philosophy really been as “revolutionary”
and “deconstructive,” has it been as much of an
enterprise of rupture with existing thought and reality
as it had the pretence of being? Or hasn't it rather
efficiently accompanied an ongoing social movement [in
the West during these last two decades], characterized by
the take-off of liberalist individualism and of consumer
society...? (“Sujet” 113-14; cf. also their 68-86)
Though one would have to say that the Sixties' movement —even
in France —was too contradictory to be judged as a monolith, Ferry-
Renault's conclusion about the social conformism of French
philosophy issuing from it, cited in the epigraph to this section
(“Sujet” 114), on the whole, alas, rings true. The pre-industrial
world believed in a fixed and monophonic Truth, and Paul of Tarsus
thought the elect would see this Platonic classical Idea “face to
face,” while in a more sophisticated variant Thomas of Aquinas
called it the “adequation of intellect to the thing” and Lenin “the
correspondence between our ideas and objective reality” (cf. Eco,
Limiti 325). If this classical idea is well lost together with all
variants of monotheism, from the Vatican to the Kremlin; if we have
indelibly learned that we are rather at Paul's “through a glass
darkly” (an impure, refracting glass at that); still the second
horn of the dilemma, “A chacun sa vérité,” is equally untenable.
For one thing, it is internally contradictory (let me call this
“the paradox of the Cretan truth-teller” or the tu quoque
boomerang), for another, it is demobilising for any collective
(i.e. efficacious) action, for a third, it leaves in practice very
non-relative institutions (State apparati, banks, nationalist
demagogies, etc.) free to do as they want. Furthermore, the
exclusively privatized adversarial stance engendered by the shift
from the validity of the theme and argument of a proposition to the
unmasking of the proposer's personality is not only singularly
unlovely but “it may easily legitimate some forms of a disquieting
intellectual terrorism,” not absent even from Foucault or Althusser
(Ferry-Renaut 116). The civility of the critical but finally
subsumptive rather than competitive-adversarial mode seems to be
dispensed with in most (though thankfully not in a few of the best)
Post-structuralists. I would even say that uncritical repetition of
Heidegger's somewhat hysterical dicta against science and
rationalism, presumably by reason of their reference to
pragmatically verifiable truths, bars the way to consistent
thinking and agency, and is thus deeply obscurantist. This is,
again, to be found in the weakest moments of both Foucault and
Althusser, not to mention the ridiculous sloganeering of Lyotard
(“rendre la philosophie inhumaine,” cf. Ferry- Renaut 111-12) and
innumerable imitators, which does not even shock the bourgeoisie
any more —one can well imagine the gloating smirk on the face of an
intelligent banker or bureaucrat should he chance to glance at it.
My feeling is that Derrida is more cautious here, while the closest
(though not very close) approximation to a dialectics of de- and
re-construction might be found in some places of the
Deleuze-Guattari opus. 
Second, even the bad patriarchal ego was able (as Jameson
remarked in a 1993 lecture) not only to have an unconscious, to
sublimate etc., but clearly had possibilities of action.
Fragmenting the atomic ego may be a necessary first step and
pleasant polemical device, but if we want to do anything in this
world of bodies and institutions—most pressingly, to contribute our
small bits and bytes toward changing the world away from what the
Robinson Crusoes have changed it into, i.e. in the direction of an
inhabitable planet—we shall have to find ways of reintegrating
agency into the electron cloud for given purposes (much like in
Stanislaw Lem's novel The Invincible). In fact, as I suggested at
the beginning, all of us do cut out a Porphyrian tree with
branchings for key decisions from the potentially unending rhizome
of our cultural encyclopedia. As Eco has wittily remarked, when
Derrida asked him for a letter of support for the Collège
International de Philosophie, “I bet Derrida assumed that: —I
should assume he is saying the truth; —I should read his message as
a univocal program...; —the signature which he asked me to put at
the bottom of my letter should be taken more seriously than
Derrida's at the end of 'Signature, événement, contexte'” (Limiti
27). For efficacious Post-structuralist theoreticians, their end
forgets their beginning. And one of Barthes's favourite lexemes,
dérivé, turned into a catch-word by Lyotard, derives after all from
the Latin de-ripare, the obverse of ad-ripare, to get to an
(uncrossable) river-bank or shore, which metaphor when sufficiently
deadened becomes our “arrive”: in order to drift from somewhere one
first had to arrive there; so that I would hope that after a period
of drifting in the desert (sous rature, so to speak) one might if
not arrive at least again glimpse some approximations to a Promised
Land. Or even, quite modestly, to what William Morris called “an
epoch of rest” —a middling, restful land, without the mass murders,
hungers, drug poisonings, air, water, and food adulterations, and
the myriad other hegemonic insults to people's flesh and
imagination. 
3. To Position a Survivable Polity, Non-Interiority, Valencies for
Subjectivity
Seid ihr wirklich im Fluss des Geschehens? Einverstanden mit
Allem was wird? Werdet ihr noch? 
[Are you really within the flowing of events? Consenting to 
All that is becoming? Are you still becoming?] 
(Brecht, Der Zweifler [The Skeptic)]
3.1. As indicated at the beginning, I feel/think that my position
(and that of many of my readers) is quite similar to his
self-characterization as a person who has left his class and cannot
(though he sometimes thought he could) find another practical
constituency. Certainly as far as the Subject is concerned, our
basic problem seems to me identical to the much maligned project of
Left-wing Modernism: how to find—in lieu of Adorno's no more
tenable “bourgeois individual, the thinking subject” (230)—some
“supraindividual” (and in my opinion also “infraindividual”)
possibility of agency, i.e. a Subject, which could practically and
cognitively use and valorize at least some of our personal
experiences without demanding a sacrifice of the personal intellect
and civil dignity. If there is to be a politically acceptable
“post-Modernism” (a question on which the jury is still out), it
would have to set sail again, with all due corrections of course
and crew, on this so far shipwrecked project. 
Of course, in our epistemological crisis where despondency and
obfuscation embrace, just what this project may now cognitively and
politically (therefore, if you wish, ethically) be is much easier
defined by negatives than by positives. Insofar as our enchantments
(e.g., the socialist and then the feminist one) were insufficiently
critical and self-critical, our disenchantments are legitimate and
cannot be simply “sublated.” But this does not authorize us to
abandon the quest for a communal positionality or survivable
polity—in good politics as well as in good logics: ex
propositionibus mere particularibus nihil sequitur, it does not
follow from a particular historical defeat, however huge and
painful, that long-duration necessities—such as, that the survival
of Homo sapiens sapiens has precedence over the profit
principle—are no longer necessary. We need to transcend the
simple-minded Post-structuralist opposition of the bad old,
centred, stable subject vs. the good new (good because new?),
decentred, drifting subject. Rigid patriarchal stability of the
personally named firm vs. riding the tempests of Global Capitalism
Inc. “like to the leaves in Vallombrosa”: the exhilaration may be
in both cases real, but it is very limited and limiting. A plague
on both your houses! As Jameson formulates it in this issue and in
another unpublished document: the opposite of the centred subject
does not have to be the schizophrenic subject, but could be the
collective one. His exemplar is then Sartre's Critique of
Dialectical Reason in which the group is a circulation of
positions, so that at a certain time everyone in the group is the
centre but overall no one is the centre. Sartre's theory of group
formation thus “decenters the individual subject not by dissolving
centrality but by making it omnipresent: ...the hierarchical fact
of centrality is here overcome by its absolute extension and as it
were democratization” (“Representations” MS 27). Benjamin's
explicit and Adorno's implicit yearning for a Subject that
reconciles a generality without rigidity to a singularity without
privatized marginality—what Brecht discussing his play Man is Man
called, in opposition to the Nazis, a “good collective”—can thus be
given a first, if brief and sketchy, image and figuration. 
Half a dozen years ago, in my first clearing of the ground for
an approach to the Subject, I went through some of the milestones
of its history, from the breakdown of the people's collective body
that Bakhtin thought to have identified (in Rabelais) through
Hobbes and Freud to Foucault and some feminists. My conclusion was
that if we still lack a viable theory of the Subject, is this not
the case because we have first to estrange the whole doctrinally
individualist approach, to hold it at arm's length and eventually
break it down, in order to break out of its epistemological and
ontological horizon of Death? And how can this breakout happen if
not by means of some updated notions of collectivity? This still
begs many central questions, to begin with how do we not only
affirm the overarching opposition of vitality vs. necrophilia, but
also locate precise social groups and actions with respect to this
divide. And I concluded that if my whole argument held, Bakhtin
could give us the perhaps essential pointer that the subject should
not be looked at as a monad. Indeed, one way of formulating the
dead end of what in Fichte's term can be called the “perfectly
sinful” capitalist society is to say that in it “being human
coincides with the physical individuality”: “And this same
principle: 'Me and therefore not the others,' each person in this
society practices against each person, and this for each and all
thing-tokens of any commodity which that person needs for its own
existence, and therefore all around itself for all that its
existence altogether is” (Sohn-Rethel 113 and 201). To the
contrary, the personal individuality should be understood as a
limit-zone of collective bodies and subjects (Suvin, “Subject”
187). 
This is not merely or primarily a utopian wish (in itself a
beginning of wisdom). I do not know any tenable discussion of
subjectivity which would not conclude it is constructed in
relationships between non-isolated people. Bakhtin reminds us that
individuals communicate by means of the “social material of signs”
which “can arise only on interindividual territory” (Volosinov 12).
Wittgenstein has reminded us that private normativity and private
language are impossible (349ff.). Child psychologists from Piaget
and Vygotsky, and lately feminists, have reminded us just how
contradictory is the Cartesian position that, on the one hand,
reason is distributively universal (well—at least for adult
upper-class Western males), yet on the other, cognition is
introspection of an individual mind  for whom any embodiment and
all traffic with other “I”s is irrelevant (cf. Code passim). As
against this hegemonic individualist position—which runs through
Rousseau, Kant, and Mill to the Reader's Digest—, clearly our
central experiences are all relational, our lives are
interdependent, and even (especially!) the most intimate recesses
of our personalities are constructed through these relations and
interdependencies (cf. Baier). 
3.2. A central correlative of the hypothesis of a primacy of
autonomous individuals (ontogenetically and phylogenetically so
easy to falsify), which we must postulate to account for its
intuitively small possibility is the experience of solitary labour,
shared by all of us isolated—usually male—professional
intellectuals from Descartes on. The “constructors of
autonomy-centred theories” must have dispensed with child-raising
labour, observes Code (85); and I would add, with physical labour
in general. I shall return to this crucial topic in the next
section. 
Within any stance denying the billiard-ball Self, its
distinction outer-inner is, for better or worse, if not quite lost
at least radically reconfigured. Biologically, the separation of
organisms from “their” environment is only allowable for strictly
limited analytical purposes (biologists then have to speak of an
“inner environment” inside the organism); in fact, a complex mutual
enfolding is the usual case. In terms of human societies,
interaction through labour never required depth psychology, only
many- tiered “flat” (horizontal and vertical) coordinations
—Deleuze and Guattari might say plateaus. Haraway gives us a
fascinating pointer how a multiply permeable self— therefore not a
Self in my terms—is figured in the discourse of immunology (and
today of AIDS). In it, “What counts as a 'unit,' a one, is highly
problematic, not a permanent given.” This new kind of Subject is
“able to engage with others (human and non-human, inner and outer),
but always with finite consequences... situated possibilities and
impossibilities of individuation and identification... partial
fusions and dangers” (“Biopolitics” 15 and 32; cf. also Dawkins
83ff. and passim). The shift from Outer (interplanetary or
intergalactic) to Inner (psychological) Space was foreshadowed in
“New Wave” science fiction from the 1960s on; alas, in J.G. Ballard
or Harlan Ellison it often identified inner space as a kind of
Jungian archetypal jungle, so that for more sophisticated and
politically literate figurations one has to go to Lem and the
Strugatski Brothers (Ursula Le Guin and Philip Dick waver between
these poles, inclining after the collapse of the 60s' movement
toward the former; cf. Suvin Positions). Twenty years later, this
shift has permeated the PR discourse of NASA and biomedicine (see
Haraway, “Biopolitics” 26-27 and passim). 
Now, it is astounding how well this can be fitted in with
Karatani's book on the origins of 20th-Century Japanese
orientations, which can be learned from precisely because the
Japanese Meiji (19th-Century) restructuring of a whole society had
to effect in two generations an abbreviated recapitulation of four
centuries of European economic, power, and ideological development;
so that even the despotic deviations of that recapitulation
brutally show up the underlying skeleton of its European model (a
bit as the abbreviated “ontogenesis” of the embryo recapitulates in
a differing, much foreshortened context the “phylogenesis” of the
species). In Karatani's witty central argument, “Interiority was
not something that had always existed, but only appeared as the
result of the inversion of a semiotic constellation” (57).
Interiority—which we can also read as the Cartesian cogito in
interiorized space whose only quality is its imaginary extension
(62), i.e. depth—is a “discovery”: e.g., Rousseau caps the trend I
mentioned in 2.1 à propos of Shakespeare and Defoe by discovering
that language mediates the immediate “inner” experience (68, based
on Starobinski). In the ultimate triumph of Karatani's favourite
Marxian figure, inversion—the camera obscura of ideology—,
interiority grows into a system which “was not, in fact, inside us,
but rather [it was] we who were incorporated within it” (70).
Exactly the obverse of the Hellenic city-state: “To imagine the
world does not consist in rendering it present inside our mind. It
is our thought which is of the world and a presence in the world.”
(Vernant, “Preface” MS 17, and cf. Richard Rorty 47)
Thus, getting out of this bourgeois interiority, the system of
Self, and then redefining a two-dimensional but multivalent Subject
is ineluctably on today's historical agenda. Let us hope we can do
this athwart the military-scientific power complex diagnosed by
Haraway in its presently most dangerous sector, the biomedical one.
3.3. Anticipating my argument about labour, I am positing that
cognition is a material practice. If so, any cognitive agency,
producing or creating through labour, is necessarily concrete
people, within specific historical relations, material resistances,
and thus social constraints. Subjects are always located in a very
specific nexus of human relationships, direct or very indirect
(e.g. mediated by humanly constructed technology and finance as
frozen forms of human labour, cf. Marx, Grundrisse 690-711), in a
particular spacetime with a limited choice of available or
affordable agents and actions. This is also why, as suggested in
the “Introduction,” the “thick descriptions” or Possible Worlds of
fiction or fine arts are to my mind much more useful than purely
conceptual cogitations (e.g. much philosophy; so that I can read
Derrida with pleasure as a Mallarméan prose poet but not as
philosopher with any transferrable system). Sharing some of the
empirical world's limitations and resistances, the Possible Worlds
of storytelling can traffic much more richly with our usual, i.e.
hegemonic constructions of the world, in a mutually verifying and
falsifying feedback (even though the cognitive increment does not
come about in “scientific” ways). 
As to the empirical actions of a person, they rarely —after
the industrial revolution, never —happen within one unchanging
nexus. Therefore, as a rule they do not swallow or even engage the
whole person but only—to borrow a term from chemistry—some of its
“valencies” for a given type of action: the teaching valency for
teaching, the fishing valency for fishing, and so forth; on the
present physical model of the divisible and recombinable atom, one
might think of such possibilities as based on infra-individual
units less akin to various Freudian layers or drives than to free
protons-electrons or maybe even charms-quarks. The successful
Althusserian interpellations can then be thought as outside
pressures keyed into the suitable free locks in the atom of
personality. I see no difficulty in such interpellations redefining
the hierarchy that constitutes the personality by means of their
docking onto a suitable slot, on the model of the cell's protein or
the rotating space station: personality engineering was practised
by shamans much before we acquired the metaphors from molecular
engineering or science fiction (or Sloterdijk). If I were to write
a book about freedom and personality, such Harawayan topologies
(cf. her “Biopolitics”) would underlie the argument presented in
2.2. I could even find a somewhat too oligarchic pointer in
Nietzsche: “...perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a
multiplicity of subjects, whose interactions and struggle is the
basis of our thought and our consciousness in general?... [An]
aristocracy of [equal ”cells"], used to ruling jointly and
understanding how to command?" (Will 270) 
My reader may dismiss this mix of metaphors about human
imagination and therefore agency as a too “thick” fancy. I could
defend myself by citing not only chemistry, atomic physics, cell
biology or immunology but, say, Richard Rorty's pragmatism, the
insights of feminist critics such as Kaplan about “fluctuant
identity” (226), the misnamed “object relations” theory of Melanie
Klein and others, Tinbergen's study of instinct, or indeed
venerable discussions in philosophy. But in fact, this can of worms
was logically opened by the radical shift away from the body
politic discussed in 1.2. If the supra-personal group,
consanguineous or territorial, is not the locus of agency and
responsibility, and indeed of intention and value, why stop the
disintegration at a person? Because it has an “individual” body in
Huxley's sense? But that body may well be seen, e.g., as subject to
“outside” possession —by a demon, a slave-owner or a pater familias
—and thus split between different and changing responsibilities,
say after exorcism or emancipation. Physical agency is in possessed
persons (in both senses of the adjective) divorced from legal
personhood: slaves were “speaking cattle” for Aristotle, and women
empty-headed ninnies for the same Victorians who accepted the
fiction of “corporate persons.” This indicates that delimitation of
which bodies are persons is tricky in all dimensions, inferior,
superior, and even lateral: is a chimpanzee, a robot or an Alien
also a person? In just what ways? 
To strengthen the infra-personal hypothesis, I could further
jump from demonic possession and slavery to quite contemporary
processes, such as Artificial Intelligence or even the division of
economic firms into competing sub-units (cf. a survey in Elster
ed.). AI authorities have found it necessary to postulate the mind
as a “society” of quite circumscribed sub-"agents" organized into
larger “agencies” and those in turn into higher-level systems,
where the levels can rapidly shift for a needed action (cf. Minsky,
also Minsky and Papert). Yet finally I could not dispute the gentle
reader short of an essay the size of this one (“Cognitive,” to
appear elsewhere). Still, I think we have sufficient evidence, from
Freud and Sartre to present-day cognitivism, that there are mental
processes about which we are still deeply in the dark but which
cannot be even limned except by postulating a shifting congerie of
sub-personal units in the cognizing subject, i.e. by fragmenting
the unsplittable Self. Nonetheless, such shifting, changing, even
contradictory Subjects would in given cases (depending on the
presuppositions and interpellations) be quite ready for agency. And
to any given type of agency there would correspond a sufficiently
unitary Subject —thereby explaining the experience most of us have
that we  possess some unity, that the loving or painful
impingements of reality are happening to a Subject with a unique
body and memories that may at its best attain to what Nietzsche has
in his meditation on Schopenhauer wondrously called a “productive
uniqueness,” which cannot be simply dismissed as individualist
ideology. 
As Jameson suggests in this issue, such types would be
correlative (and insofar as they certainly have some kind of
substance, beginning with a semantic and ideological one, they
would be consubstantial) to their field of action, constituting,
e.g., a mathematical, scientific or aesthetic—but also a fatherly
or collegial—Subject. The most important of such Subjects would be
anchored in the historically most durable institutions such as the
law and codified religion (both of which also insert speech into
political decision-making in the guise of rhetorics), medicine
(which inserted semiotics) or warfare. Further, a lot of work has
been done both in sociology and theatre studies on the notion of
“role,” which should be reread with the intention of freeing it
from its unwarranted presupposition of marginality to a central
“actor.” In fact, I strongly suspect we already have a good
approximation to the mercurial Subjects of my preceding paragraph
in the nomadic  collectives and personalities from both the
successful neo-capitalist “power-elite” (as Wright Mills concluded
long ago) and the neo-tertiary-sector (cf. e.g. Poster's somewhat
enthusiastic view of computer writing, 114ff.), whose twists and
turns have so stymied all “nuclear”—e.g. old-fashioned trade union
—expectations. As I suggested above, the Post-structuralist theory
comes from an one-sided, unproductive absolutization of the
neo-tertiary personal experience (most clearly in Baudrillard),
since university teachers belong to it. It remains, as the Left
from the feminists to Paul Smith and Jameson has been asking, to
make the new Subject available for democratic resistance and
reconfiguration, against the horizon of a survivable community. 
4. Briefly, On Body Politics
Those who believe in substantiality are like cows; those who
believe in emptiness are worse.
Saraha (9th Century C.E.)
4.1. Descartes's philosophical soul apprehended metaphysics and
cognized through a reason opposed to the fallacious bodily senses.
As he wrote, “this 'me,' that is to say, the soul by which I am
what I am, is entirely distinct from the body.” “I am a thinking
thing,” proclaim the Meditations, whereas “I possess a body with
which I am very intimately conjoined” (Works 1: 101 and 190). This
may lead us to notice that if in the sentence [ego] cogito ergo
[ego] sum, the first and outstanding problem is the “I” (ego), yet
a correlative, and in some ways even anterior or constitutive
problem is cogito/sum, the relationship of mind and body. As almost
all commentators have underlined, the sovereign epistemological
Self, which will by the time of Kant also understand itself as
ethical, is in Descartes predicated on a reason “autonomous... in
two senses”:
First, the quest for certain knowledge should be...
undertaken separately by each rational being; and second,
that quest is a journey of reason alone, unhindered—and
hence also unaided—by the senses.... [Descartes's]
account of knowledge-seeking is of an introspective
activity that depends neither on the embodied nature of
a knower nor on his (or her) intersubjective relations.
(Code 112)
What has less often been foregrounded is whether there is (as
I think) a necessary linkage, within this understanding of
understanding—or this meta-epistemic stance—, between the two
“narcotizings,” that of the body and that of the epistemic or
primary collectivity. (Of course, nobody but the crassest solipsist
denies the secondary social collectivity of the knowers'
communicating the results of inquiry, certainly not Descartes.) Yet
it seems probable that the loss of body as validation for
inscribing the Subject's time, space, and name into the socially
recognized chronotope and identification (e.g., gender, class,
race...), necessarily devalues what Marx called “the ensemble of
social relationships” constituting the embodied personality. The
body's sensual perceptions unified by a personal brain and
participation in a network of interpersonal relationships are
simply the two faces of the same very permeable interface (of
membership in one another, as Paul of Tarsus the communal organizer
—for once laudably —said). How would, e.g., the thinking ego be
fed, kept from fever by shelter and clothing, supplied with pen and
paper to fix its cogitations, and indeed taught the language for
them, without a whole array of (often female) caring and/or
employed family members, teachers, helpers, suppliers, and so
forth? Is there not an at least partial analogy here between a
factory organizer and the cogitating pure mind? Descartes's very
Platonic despisal of the body's desires and sensuality as epistemic
prison, and indeed his logically following downgrading even of the
brain with its inferior imaging and perceiving, in favour of a pure
mind (cf. Bordo 89-95), is diachronically a direct continuation of
the original Christian horror of body and fixation on the soul; but
synchronically, it is an absolutist and dualist project to master
and eliminate the inimical and potentially rebellious mob of unruly
passions: “even those who have the feeblest souls can acquire a
very absolute dominion over all their passions...” (Treatise on the
Passions, Works 1: 356). Only when properly subdued, senses and
emotions may be practically indulged in, particularly in the
company of women. On top of the division of labour into physical
and mental, there is in Descartes a “sexual division of mental
labour” wherein it is the woman's task “to preserve the sphere of
the intermingling of mind and body.... [She] will keep [soft
emotions and sensuousness] intact for [the Man of Reason].” (Lloyd
50) 
The Cartesian full split between the res extensa and res
cogitans is thus a pseudo-materialist translation of the body vs.
soul theologeme which both modifies its terms and preserves its
deep structure for an ostensibly lay, bourgeois rather than
clerical, philosophizing. The thinker is for Descartes in fact a
God-like demiurge in no place or time, his “I” has no name or face.
In the 19th Century this pernicious stance will be exfoliated to
say that Truth can be found either inside the objectivized
space-filling stuff (body) for each of us, as best seen in art, or
alternatively outside —though through—the thinking stuff for all of
us, as best seen in science. The logical horizon of the first
stance is primary solipsism (from which Descartes himself was not
always that far, see e.g. his replies to Gassendi's reasonable
materialist doubts, Works 1: 212ff.) and it entails the pretence of
Romantic artists that they are not thinkers. The logical horizon of
the second stance is secondary scientism and it entails the
pretence of Positivist scientists that they are value-free. 
In this suppression of matter the stubbornly material bodies
are reduced to “absolutely dominated” objects. The Cartesian space
is (absurdly) divided into the pure billiard-ball Self, an isolated
subject of power and knowledge, outside whom remains the world,
“nature” —but a nature as corpus vile, “reduced to the status of an
inexhaustible fund against the background of which its products
appear and from which they are wrested” (de Certeau, Practice 157).
The mind is then posited as a mirror to nature, though it is not
clear what authorizes this metaphor (cf. R. Rorty). The body,
evacuated in the first Cartesian Meditation, returns as dead, inert
object, to be policed in its desires (especially the sexual ones)
by a ferocious conscience (cf. Vernant, “L'individu” 36 and
Karatani 79, 89, and passim) and dissected by an all-powerful
anatomist, correlative to a metaphysics of Death (cf. Barker 95-112
and passim). As amply shown by Foucault, the discourse of clinical
medicine predicated on the isolated individual is (I argue this in
“Subject” 195) defined by the horizon of death: not only do death
and disease “scientifically” constitute each body's individuality
and intelligibility, but Death is the end as well as the essence of
abstract human life. This has in our century been proved both by
Nazi doctors and by practically all big business (chemical,
pharmaceutical, tobacco, agribusiness, etc.) precisely on our
systemically tortured, infected, poisoned bodies. 
Thus, the apparently highly esoteric philosophical problem of
cognitive certainty with which Descartes began, finally, when
pursued under the aegis of a monotheist craving for Oneness,
threatens the value and even possibility  of a shared world. While
the latter is simply a self-defeating proposition, even if
sufficiently mystifying within our circles of an epicyclical
intelligentsia, the former leads to today's frenzied individualism,
masqued as the dernier cri of PoMo fashion, becoming the cynical
obverse of oppressive hegemonies. The Western narcissism of unique
Selves has in the last 20 years even abused the body as an alibi
for the “me only” stance, constructed with help of much pop
psychoanalysis, and in some French feminist theory also
linguistics, that displaces relationships among people onto the
purely sexual or purely aesthetic (cf. Kipnis 85ff.). But the
bodily stubbornly remains enmeshed with the political, as a
collective standpoint. The exemplum of Japan may again show (but we
have so many other examples, from precisely the analysis of the
Cartesian moment through Foucault to the Greenblattian
“self-fashioning”!) that the modern subject was established “in
tandem with... the modern state,” its economic and educational
pressures, as its frère ennemi, obverse or complement whose shocked
retreat into inner-oriented depths forgot “that 'interiority' is
itself politics and that it is a manifestation of absolute
authority” (Karatani 94 and 95). For “politics [especially
liberating politics, note DS] rests on the possibility of a shared
world” (Haraway, “Cyborgs” 10) —shunned by individualists such as
Japanese or other intellectuals while hollowed out and usurped by
the State as protector and policer of Foucault's “controlled
insertion of bodies into the machinery of production” as “an
indispensable element in the development of capitalism” (141).
Shared-world politics would mean that institutions whose ultimate
horizon is private profit regardless of destructions of our senses
and sensorium (whose nexus is the brain), are merchants of death in
all the literal and metaphoric senses of that phrase. Such a
structural “worship of death” (Haraway, “Cyborgs” 20) was part of
the reasoning behind my conclusion in “Subject,” and in 3.1 above,
that the epistemological and ontological horizon of doctrinal
individualism was Death, so that it is indispensable to get rid of
it before it gets rid of all of us. 
But how may we break out of this deadly subject vs. objects
split? As far as I can tell, with help of at least two key
strategies. One, as suggested earlier, is a focus on labour, whose
bearer is, of course, the body. One of the decisive contributions
of Marx's is his replacement of Feuerbach's, and Kant's, passive
and one-way pivot for people's relationship to reality, perception
(itself ambiguously oscillating between universality and
individuality, just as Descartes did), by the interactivities of
labour. This provides at least the horizon for using Vico's
contention that people can understand history because they have
created it: for Marx, labour is the “objectification” of
generically human life, since “[man] duplicates himself not only,
as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality,
and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has
created” (114). “[I]t is not the isolated individual who is active
in labour,” comments Marcuse: “in and through the objects of
labour, men are shown one another in their reality” (23, and cf.
the whole discussion 7ff. passim). Finally, the meaning of labour
is to find, beyond the here and now, lineaments of alternative
worlds of things and relationships “visible for each 'I' under a
plurality of aspects,” the possibility of “taking possession of an
indefinite [i.e. plural, note DS] time and space; and one could
easily show that the signification of speech or that of suicide and
of the revolutionary act is the same” (Merleau-Ponty, Structure
175). 
However, the body is not only a substratum subjected to
political economy, whose crucial hegemony, that occupies between
two thirds and one quarter of the weekly time for all “gainfully
employed” bodies, Marx rightly challenged —but therefore also
followed —step by step. The quite indispensable Marxian paradigm
would have to be expanded following Nietzsche's kindred insistence:
“Essential, to start from the body and to use it as the red thread”
(Werke 635) —a stance in fact prefigured in the young Marx's
Epicurean assumption that the development of the senses is the
central criterion for both hominization and alienation, and
continuing as a basso ostinato throughout his opus. As best
envisaged —to my knowledge —by Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology, also
Structure), embodiment is both a lived experience of being body and
a realization that the body is the site of cognition or
understanding, which is itself inextricably tied to embodied action
as preparation, surrogate, response or feedback validator for it.
Reintegrating the body into our knowledge theory by means of its
being the co-determining anchorage for stance or standpoint —to
begin with, for personal and possessive pronouns as well as for all
deixis and all metaphors of vision and orientation —is, I would
conclude, indispensable for any further clear thinking about the
Subject.4 (A third focus, de Certeau and a host of other
extrapolators from linguistics would argue, should be speech, but
I would prefer it integrated into Bakhtinian ideology or
Foucauldian discursive genealogies. At any rate, such focal
categorizations are pragmatic matters and my suggestions are
open-ended.) As Jameson says toward the end of his essay here,
these foci might offer “some more adequate approach...to agency and
praxis in general” (MS 26). 
4.2. From Marx to Foucault, we have been shown how the blood-soaked
birth of the capitalist labour-force and of bourgeois subjection
(e.g. sexuality) has, by physical eviction of villagers off their
land or physical surveillance of city-dwellers, reconstituted the
shape of human bodies and subjects more intimately and thus more
radically than any Oriental despotism. Today's threats of
molecularly engineered species modification, lurking behind the
noble curative phrases of the human genome mapping, is a logical
continuation of this line: we may well be in for an electronically
enhanced version of Wells's Lunar society (The First Men in the
Moon, varied in much SF of the last 40 years). Diachronically, this
latches on to the no doubt remedial but also oppressive
medicalization and medical construction of subject Foucault has so
relentlessly pursued in his whole opus. But even brute physical
force was always accompanied by ideological rationalizations; and
the ruling classes of economically complex, industrialized
societies have learned from the World Wars that it is on the whole
more profitable and less dangerous to have wars and
counter-revolutions on the periphery only. Beyond physical force,
the relative importance of ideological constructions of
subjectivities has grown enormously in the last 200 and especially
in the last (say) 60 years. The discourse of the media, from the
mass press through radio and cinema to today's electronics, is
perhaps now the dominant divulgator of such constructions. But the
actual terms for these media were invented elsewhere: at a first
remove, in theatre and literature; but going further into the
depths of our cultural encyclopedia, we encounter the privileged
eldest discourses of (I think) warfare, religion, medicine, and
law. I shall in spite of my technical ignorance attempt to supply
a few hints only about the legal subject. 
Jameson speculates, though in a prudently conditional clause,
that it might perhaps underlie other “conceptions of subjectivity”
he had mentioned, the epistemological, logical, and psychological
one (“Representations” MS 25).5 At any rate, the legal subject is
clearly the pivot between State power and both the oral and written
discourses of individuation. While the martial, the medical, and
the religious (or at least the magical) subjects predate class
society, Athenian law is consubstantial with the rise of the State
(and with the first “mass medium,” Attic tragedy, as exemplarily
foregrounded in its first, religious-cum-political-cum-legal
masterpiece, Aeschylus's Oresteia trilogy). “Above all, the
individual appears at the heart of the [polis] institutions through
the development of law” (Vernant, “L'individu” 29). The Athenian
codification of, and indeed bifurcation into, criminal and civil
law has remained effective until today: in the first sector, the
passage from consanguineous (clan) vendetta to civic tribunals
constructs “the notion of the criminal individual... as subject of
crime and object of verdict (jugement, judgment, sentence)”; in the
second sector, the institution of a personal testament (third
century) allowed the posthumous transmission of goods by the “will”
of a particular, irrespective of the “house” or “dynasty” (ibidem
29-30). Further systematic developments of such (of course,
strictly limited) juridical personalization will come in the Roman
State, where jurisprudence became the hegemonic discourse and
whence it was transmitted to all subsequent European discourse. For
one example, the notion of judgment clearly underlies the Christian
idea of Judgment Day. For another, the Roman (political) law is the
precondition for the idea of laws of nature. For a third, this idea
together with its source in the statutory pole of law, seems the
precondition for ethics, certainly for the Kantian categorical
imperative that is formulated as the inner correlative to the
Copernican vision of astronomical order. 
In modern European thought, the key testimony occurs in
Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, where it is
unambiguously stated that “person” (as different from an individual
substance and a human being)
is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their
merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable
of a law, and happiness, and misery. This personality
extends itself beyond present existence to what is past,
only by consciousness —whereby it becomes concerned and
accountable. (Book 2, ch. XXVII)
Almost each clause of Locke's has rightly been the subject of wide
and ongoing debate (cf. A.O. Rorty ed.), but beyond noticing how
the English 18th-Century practice had evacuated the military,
medical, religious, and theatrical antecedents, I wish to discuss
the stress on agency and on continuity with a past. Locke anchors
all other attributes of agenthood (intelligence, feeling,
consciousness) in legal practices such as appropriation and
accountability. His insistence on the past and memory is necessary
for the juridical purposes of liability. However, from the times of
Balzac on, ambition in big cities can be discussed in terms of
personal qualities —looks, education, energy, etc.—being the Self's
capital to be wisely invested (Bourdieu). Therefore we have today,
in a society “hotter” than Locke's largely land-based one and which
has instituted “futures trading” in all stock-markets and planning
in almost every company and State, no choice but to focus on, or at
least integrate equally, choice and future. This reveals that what
a society defines as agency and person depends on its hegemonic
priorities (cf. A.O. Rorty 5). 
In spite of this longue durée history, as Nietzsche's
meditation on history argues, literal equality —preeminently the
one before the law —strives to abolish history, which consists of
unique existents, in the eternal return of the same (Benjamin).
Literally, this equality is of course untenable, and the tension
between practice and ideology has been incorporated into the law
itself, e.g. as one between the casus and the statute. The latest
moves in this age-old gambit are revealing: what have been somewhat
ironically called conversions to “juridical humanism” (Ferry-
Renault 112-13) of the ex-68ers such as Foucault, who earlier
proclaimed that “one has...to get rid of the subject itself” (Power
117), come hand in hand with the ideology of the end to history.
This might serve to indicate also how the juridical (legal) subject
is from Plato on certainly the key to the “political subject,” more
usually talked about in terms of ethics (Kant) or power
(Machiavelli, Hobbes). As Balibar convincingly argues, the Roman
juridical figure of the subiectus (person submitted to imperium,
sovereign authority) reaches through Christianity right up to the
theory and practice of the citizen, i.e. up to today.6 But I would
have to confess that I know of very little contemporary argument
about the political subject that usefully follows or indeed
corrects Rousseau, Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, and/or Lenin. And yet it
is evidently a matter of highest concern right now how at the time
of these names (i.e. since the rise of modern nation-states and
Braudel's commercial capitalisms) there comes about on the basis of
the legal subject first the citizen (who in our century
acknowledges and subsumes labour under the State), then the homo
oeconomicus, and finally the chauvinist. A huge array of legal
studies in our time (say from Pashukanis and Rawls to Negri) at the
crossroads of philosophy and politics, awaits examination here.
4.3. The huge problematic of the body finally may be seen to
become a key for socialized perception and imagination, and for
envisaging not only the Subject but also all agency as stances. I
have proposed in “Soul” that the relations of bodies to their
perception of the mutually enfolding world can be (provisionally,
if you wish etymologically) called aesthetics, while for the
interplay of collective and personal bodies no other word but
politics will do; and I would assume these are today two key
agential fields, because they are both, quite ineluctably, both
personal and non- personal. We could call them transpersonal
vectors, bearing transpersonal or collective subjecthoods: just try
to imagine solipsist politics, sex or art! As to imagination and
its topologies, I pursue this matter in “Cognitive.” Keeping to
minimal, yet I hope suggestive, indications, I must here content
myself with this much, aware that my approach may well not have
entered into large areas of possibly central importance. 
5. An End (finis, not telos) 
Only he who builds the future has a right...to pass judgment
on the past. 
Nietzsche
“...the classic conclusion, in which a book's central arguments are
rehearsed imperturbably for one last time, as if closing the door
on everything that has been said, is inappropriate in a work of
history,” concluded Braudel after 2,000 pages (619). Since to my
mind all our arguments are ineluctably historical, this holds a
fortiori for any work of a much smaller scope. But I would like
this to be a final twist of the essay's spiral, picking up some
problems in the light of what has been argued in it earlier and
looking at their horizons. 
5.1. While the issue for which this is written was being prepared,
a book appeared called Who Comes After the Subject?, initiated by
Jean-Luc Nancy and co-edited in the somewhat changed English
version by Eduardo Cadava and Peter Connor, with numerous
contributions by a representative array of French philosophical
luminaries of the day. Far from feeling “scooped” (the intentions
and addressees of this issue are rather different), I am happy to
have had the opportunity to reflect on it while writing this, e.g.
on the important contribution by Balibar cited earlier, and I would
like to cull a very few questions from it. If this were a survey of
the volume —but it is not—, I would start by noticing that the
briefest contribution, two pages by Deleuze, is to my mind the most
magisterial one (this is a compliment), arriving as it does at its
end upon the declaration that “the notion of the subject has lost
much of its interest on behalf of pre-individual singularities and
non-personal individuations” and upon further horizons of this
whole “field of questions” (95). 
Nancy's “Introduction” identifies the book's question as the
sign of a rupture in philosophy and history, which would yet like
to avoid the dilemma of “the subject's simple liquidation” and “a
'return to the subject' (proclaimed by those who would like to
think that nothing has happened...)” (5). I agree that the only
wise strategy is tertium datur (Hegel is not a dead dog): the
one-sided exaggerations of technocratic structuralism and of
somewhat overcholeric thinkers such as Foucault, a useful author
before he descended into orthodox Heideggerianism, are by now
behind us; while a return to Kant or even phenomenology (not to
speak to the crassest German Idealism) can only be of any
conceivable use if it is a reculer pour mieux sauter, productively
cannibalizing them. However, I then secondarily think it is unwise
(because impossible) to jettison all existing terminology; an
impulse to reinterpret, if need be subversively, a term like The
Subject seems to me to do better justice to the long-duration
continuities of human history, while avoiding PoMo Babylonian
flashiness (what Derrida here calls “the vested confusion of the
doxa,” 98). However, I am not sure what is the use of all this talk
about “rupture” (except self-puffery that goes before a fall):
every age since, say, 1800 is both a continuation and a rupture,
depending on what one wishes to envisage. Have the Gulf War or the
Yugoslav Nationalist Wars been a rupture with the Opium War of
1839-42 or the Balkan War of 1912? Is dying from Agent Orange,
Chernobyl radiation or AIDS more dignified and palatable than the
great plague epidemics of Boccaccio and Defoe? Maybe because of the
new technologies involved? Has the hunger and cold of the homeless
not only in Bosnia but also in San Francisco broken with the hunger
and cold before 1960 or 1940? Is the worldwide division into
Disraeli's “two nations” of the rich and the poor not just as
lopsided and bad today as at the time of Chinese or Roman emperors?
Is it growing smaller? Isn't it even ethically and politically
(though not sensually) worse because human creativity has in the
last 100 years finally given us the means to make this planet
habitable? And since the answers to my rhetorical questions are
clear, what is the function of the self-congratulatory “rupture”
slogan today? Wouldn't elementary modesty require that we think
rather with Benjamin and Brecht about an ongoing normality of
catastrophe in order to estrange it and begin coping with it? 
If we did, we would have to start asking quite referential
questions about agency and responsibility, directly dovetailing
philosophy and politics. For example: Who is murdering the citizens
of Sarajevo? Serbian guns? No: guns do not aim and discharge
themselves. Serbs? No: many people of Serbian origin (the best)
have chosen to remain in the hardships of Sarajevo and defend a
non-ethnically-cleansed, bastardized, joyously intermarrying
polity. And so on. So what kind of Subjects are those brainwashed
murderers (and their ethnic counterparts on all other sides of
those wars)? Where is the locus of responsibility and
intentionality: in their selfish genes? No. In their
(anti-nationalist, but alas quite inefficient) schooling in Tito's
Yugoslavia? No. Obviously it must be in some vectors going through
desperate people rather than emanating from their hard centre. 
Thus on the one hand we could analyze this as a subjectless
web of fluctuating pressures within global economic and political
conjunctures (the World Bank loans and the impoverishment of a
fairly well-off Yugoslav population, the separatist sympathies and
financial intervention of Germany and the Vatican, the withdrawal
of both the menacing Russian and supporting US empire) encroaching
upon each other. And on the other hand there are potential
collectives who get, in Eco's terms, “narcotized,” e.g. the working
class or the patriots of a federal Yugoslavia, or “boldfaced” as
selfish elites (equally in the Slovenian, Croatian, and Serbian
power-centres) construct “threatened ethnicities.” From different
stances both the subjectless fluxes and the collective Subjects are
potentially mobilizable (“true”) for practice and for explanation.
Finally, if one needs a support and constituency for action,
preferably on a large scale, one would have to arrest the flux and
name a collective in any particular chronotope for any particular
agency (Slovenian or Croatian elites engineering separation from
Yugoslavia, or Serbian elites engineering Great Serbia). So while
it is true that totalizing collectives are today, after the demise
of what ought to be called “really non-existent socialism,” in
disrepute among theoreticians, obviously they practically exist
(e.g. the World Bank with all of its arteries, veins, and
capillaries). Alongside with Foucauldian micro-collectives, their
quicker and more complex modus operandi is what may have to be
re-theorized in the age of computers. 
5.2. This means, however, that cognitive communities thrashing out
epistemological-cum-political stances are more than ever needed for
the task of exploring the varieties of infra- and supra-personal
Subjects, of understanding the construction of these new, sometimes
very dangerous but sometimes very exciting, collective Subjects.
This has been clear in science since Bacon and theorized since
Pierce: “the very origin of the conception of reality shows that
this conception essentially involves the notion of a community”
(quoted in Eco, Limiti 336-37, and see Eco's epistemological
conclusions from this against the Derridian unlimited dérive in the
whole essay, 325-38, also 27-28). Thus, Peircean pragmatism is a
good ally insofar as it substitutes for the Cartesian “pure
observer” epistemology the epistemology of an agent in a community
of agents. However, in order to follow the rapid changes around us
and to inflect them in a liberating way, I doubt this can be
confined to what sociologists call “found communities” (families,
nations, professional groups) which supply identities at the cost
of orthodoxy and boundaries of admissibility for people and for
stances. To my mind, an existing professional doxa similar to that
proposed by Fish (if I understand him well) is much too involved in
little power-grabs of its own to seriously square off against,
e.g., the business ethos or nationalist pride. As always, valid
cognitive communities are “chosen” rather than “found” (cf.
Hartsock passim and Code 276-77). Themselves dynamic, by definition
non-monolithic, and subject to the often healthy pull of
overlapping subcommunities (cf. Nelson 148-50 and passim), they
exist on the unstable interface between pragmatic and utopian
realities, the powerful status quo community as found and the
productive or creative future-oriented community as chosen. 
“Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will,” proclaimed
Sorel and Gramsci. Optimistically, I think of this issue,
including my contribution to it, as a very modest approximation to
such a cognitively productive community. 
Notes
1. My thanks go to Marc Angenot, Anna Antonopoulos, Caroline
Bayard, Catherine Graham, Fredric Jameson, and Yamada Kazuko for
discussions and indications of much relevant secondary literature;
and for financial support to the SSHRC and a Canada Council Killam
Fellowship. I cannot expatiate upon my debts to this issue's
contributors, but I have learned much on the Subject from work with
them. All non-attributed translations into English are mine.  
2. In an essay whose body and bibliography have grown
uncomfortably large, I have to be impaled on one horn of the
dilemma whether to expressly differentiate within the sometimes
very self-contradictory authors —e.g. Nietzsche —as well as
polemicize with the to me unacceptable ones —e.g. Lyotard —or
whether to simply leave out what I found useless. The first is
philologically proper but uneconomical and often boring, the second
may come across as abrupt obiter dicta and somewhat arrogant. Time
and space being what they are today, I have decided for the second
horn, and my polemics will (with few exceptions) mainly be by
omission. However, omission from the bibliography may also indicate
that some modern classics, mentioned by name only, are
omnipervasive in our —my—discourse (so that they can be found in
the apparati of other works cited, including mine). As to the rest,
I imitate Molière and je prends mon bien où je le trouve. 
3. Usually, however, it can be observed that there are
limitations on those admitted to fully individual status, roughly
similar to the Athenian exclusion of women, children, slaves,
strangers, and other “speaking cattle” from democracy. Much of the
Foucauldian micropolitics of “human rights” (from Blacks to gays
and indeed “animal rights”), taking note of the failures of
revolutionary changes of the capitalist framework, consists of
efforts to break down these limitations within that framework. 
4. In this cluster of problems the present extraordinary
fashion of denigrating vision would have to be faced. As Jameson
suggests in this issue, the original Foucauldian and then feminist
onslaught on vision —including image, e.g. in movies —unfortunately
relied much too one-sidedly on the “essentially theological
tradition of the sinfulness of looking as such, and the
relationship of that visual libido to the sinfulness of the body in
general” ("Representation" MS 23); it should be added that some
main perpetrator of this translation of monotheism into
psychoanalysis, Mulvey, has laudably had second thoughts though the
harm persists (a stimulating brief critique is in Kipnis 8-10,
108-09 and passim). Cf., beside the fundamental Merleau-Ponty (all
titles below) , Berger, Code 140-53 and 252-53, Jonas, Keller and
Grontkowski, Lowe Strawson 90ff., and the splendid pages by Vernant
in this issue on the close link between vision, cognition, and
sight as presence to the community (MS 17-24), which could well be
extend ed from the Hellenic polis to all other non-individualist
civilizations (cf. Suvin “Soul”). Having been much preoccupied with
this in my work on theatre, I sketched in “Theses” some first
questions about the necessity of vision with an acknowledged seer
and with the proper (e.g. Brechtian) distance for understanding
—without a Truth in the depths—as well as in an alliance with other
senses. From that point of view (sic), I find the argument that
vision necessarily means alienation and subjugation useless for
discriminating when it actually does so —e.g. often in Cartesianism
and post-Cartesian “objectivism” relying on an absolutized “mind's
eye” (cf. Haraway, “Situated” 581). 
5. I confess to sharing deep suspicions against that
(seemingly dominant) post-Cartesian individualist psychology which
usually does not concern itself with relations between people but
with the individual's mental events (perceptions, sensations etc.).
I would much rather follow the lead of Mauss and talk about
possible bodily “syntaxes of gestures” —walking, eating, erotics,
etc.—into which “psychological” phenomena are embedded and which
can be understood as given stances. Even Freud, whom —despite what
I see as the nonsense of his key concepts, beginning with the
Oedipus complex—, I revere as a great if mistaken Columbus of our
mental life, great novelist, and great literary and cultural
critic, assumes the bourgeois individualist body as his basis and
horizon. Therefore, he has little to say about class or race, what
he says about women is best forgotten, he limits his dethroning of
consciousness mainly to an apparatus of a few, relatively neatly
divided thermodynamic levels (cf. Suvin, “Subject” 192-94), and the
practice of psychoanalysis has been coopted for adjustment to
rather than questioning of the status quo. Jung's horizons seem to
me unacceptable for much the same reasons as Heidegger's. Even so,
I have found a number of texts in psychology, from James and Piaget
to Bruner, as well as in psychoanalysis, fascinating, and I attempt
to use some of them in “Cognitive.” 
6. See on subjection also Barker. I wish to eschew here
debates by historians of philosophy (and Blut und Boden
etymologists like Heidegger) whether the post- Cartesian “subject”
is really in a straight line of descent from Aristotle's
hypokeimenon (the underlying), which with Balibar and Williams I
strongly doubt. At any rate the legal-cum-political subiectus, the
subjected person, seems to me at least as important as (and
probably the origin of) the subiectum, the subjective person or
indeed the underlying existent. Again, we could take the
foreshortened process in Japan as an example: “The modern Japanese
subject... emerged through the conflation of [being subject to the
feudal Lord] whose historical origins had been forgotten, with the
psychological ego” (Karatani 95).
7. In his latest book Spectres of Marx (éd. Galilée, 1993)
Derrida wishes to reactualize the lesson of “a certain Marx,” most
urgent in face of the new consensus that glosses over its spreading
“plagues”: “never on Earth have so many men, women and children
been enslaved, starved or exterminated.” I am very happy that my
essay converges with such bearings (of a book I have only had time
to superficially peruse, and quote mostly according to review
echoes) and with their horizon that intellectuals have
responsibilities toward suffering people and economic justice.
Derrida's appeals for a “new International” (his quotation marks)
may be here a key move. It is, however, not clear how he thinks
this link “without coordination, without party, ...an alliance
without institutions" could effect "a (theoretical and practical)
critique” of such matters as “international law or the concepts of
State and nation.” Surely at least a loosely linked (to begin with,
telematic) focusing of cognitive forces is a precondition for any
impact beyond evanescent academic effervescence — which is a
welcome oasis but also a debilitating ghetto unless transcended.
For a “practical critique” to intertwine with lectures and books,
intermittent and non-freezing groupings (and where else are e.g.
the Deconstructionists?) and institutions (to begin with probably
teaching centers and publications)  and a solidarity around
concrete, democratically chosen objectives seems absolutely needed.
Otherwise, we shall have vague horizons without political agents or
Subjects of resistance.
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